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COPYRIGHT, FAIR USE,
AND

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
BY SAMUEL COURTNEY1

The fundamental question this paper seeks to address is whether religious
free exercise constitutional interests should supersede copyright and fair use
doctrine. The recent Ninth Circuit decision in Worldwide Church of God v.
Philadelphia Church of God raised interesting issues on whether the
copyright defense of fair use may properly be applied to religious free
exercise constitutional interests. 2 This decision will have a significant impact
on religious sects that choose to break off from a larger religious organization
and whether they are subject to liability for infringing on the religious
doctrine of the original organization. In cases where this issue comes before
a judge, copyright law may demand that a court determine the most important
part of a work or even whether a work is fact or fiction. While the court must
adhere to these principles in making its decision, it should also refrain from
making subjective judgments on the inherent value or truthfulness of a
particular faith. The United States prides itself on the separation of church
and state, and we generally believe that a court or judge is not the proper
authority to determine the goodness or truthfulness of our religious beliefs.
Copyright infringement cases involving religious doctrine, however,
simultaneously ask courts to determine which sections of religious doctrine
are the most significant, whether the work is factual, and, perhaps most
difficult and subject to judicial restraint, who authored the religious text. The
question of religious fair use is also particularly tricky because religious
organizations are typically seeking recruitment and membership growth, not
necessarily commercial monetary gain. These fair use principles clash with
constitutional religious free exercise interests, and this tension appears to be
an issue that will be raised in court for years to come.
This paper argues that constitutional free exercise considerations should not
supersede neutral copyright doctrine, and that the policy underlying the fair
1
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use defense is an important value that should be upheld in religious copyright
cases.
I.

RELIGIOUS COPYRIGHT OVERVIEW

United States copyright law protects original works fixed in any tangible
medium of expression.3 Works of authorship cover the following categories:
literary works, musical works, dramatic works, pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works, motion pictures, sound recordings, and architectural
works.4 The copyright owner of a work has the following exclusive rights: to
reproduce the copyrighted work, to prepare derivative works based upon the
copyrighted work, to distribute copies of the copyrighted work to the public
by sale, to perform the work publicly, and in the case of sound recordings, to
perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio
transmission.5 A showing of a direct infringement of any of these exclusive
rights does not turn on intent or negligence; the infringer is strictly liable.
One can anticipate that many, if not all, of these exclusive rights may be
relevant to or litigated by a religious organization. Religious organizations
are in the “business” of distributing, reproducing, and performing, by way of
sermon, their scripture and religious text. 6 Interestingly, Congress included a
section within the limitations on these rights to exclude performance of a
nondramatic literary or musical work or of a dramatico-musical work of a
religious nature, or display of a work, in the course of services at a place of
worship or other religious assembly. 7 We will see later in the discussion of
the fair use defense that showing a commercial harm or harm on the potential
market for the copyright holder is a crucial factor in determining whether a
use is fair.
In cases of religious intellectual property disputes, copyright protections
most often involve religious text or scripture. Because most faiths have
scripture that they believe was authored by a divine figure, the infringing of
their religious text is extremely important to the reputation and pride of a
religious organization. Misappropriation or infringement of scripture is an

3
4
5
6
7

17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1990).
Id.
Id. § 106(1-6).
Here the word “business” is in quotes due to the question of the non -commercial nature of faith.
Id. § 110(3).
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often-litigated issue, for example, by the church of Scientology. 8 It is also the
basis of the Worldwide Ninth Circuit case where a religious sect broke off
from its organization and published, distributed, and preached on the
identical religious scripture of the larger organization. 9 This type of dispute
is the primary category of religious copyright litigation.
The most relevant and persuasive defense in cases of religious scripture
infringement is the doctrine of fair use. Fair use is a limitation of the
exclusive rights of the copyright holder. 10 This limitation allows for
reproduction of a copyrighted work without permission from the copyright
owner for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching,
scholarship, or research. 11 There are four factors to be considered in
determining whether use is fair: (1) the purpose and character of the use,
including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work (is it
transformative?); (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon
the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. 12
The general policy idea behind fair use is similar to that behind the First
Amendment; we want to be able to criticize and comment on speech and
written works without being subject to legal liability. This is good policy and
exemplifies the American ideals of freedom to speak your mind and have
open-forum debate without the fear of government intervention or private
litigation. Fred von Lohmann argues that the doctrine of fair use allows
United States industry pioneers such as Apple to innovate in areas of
technology without fear of copyright legal liability: “[t]here would be no iPod
if Apple could not count on copyright law to permit iPod buyers to copy their
existing CD collections…there would be no TiVo but for the ability of
consumers to copy programming from broadcast, cable, and satellite
television.13
This logic also applies to new religious organizations. Fair use arguably
allows dissatisfied members of a religious organization to use the same
scripture in a new organization that they believe more closely conforms to
Wired Staff, Scientology: The Web’s First Copyright-Wielding Nemesis, W IRED (Sept. 21, 2009,
12:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/2009/09/mf-chanology-sidebar/.
9
227 F.3d 1110.
10
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1992).
11
Id. § 107 (1-4).
12
Id.
13
Fred von Lohmann, Fair Use as Innovation Policy, 23 BERKELEY T ECH . L.J. 829, 837 (2008).
8
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the teaching of that scripture. This fair use defense is the primary argument
of defendants in religious copyright cases.
The most persuasive counterargument against fair use in religious copyright
infringement cases is that while we want to permit fair commentary and
criticism, we do not want to permit direct infringement of a work simply to
profit off of the time, energy, and creativity spent by the original author.
There may be a question as to whether a church seeking new members is a
“commercial benefit” but the idea of directly copying religious scripture
verbatim and profiting one way or another is generally not fondly looked
upon in the United States. This was the argument of the Satanist temple in a
recently filed complaint, as well as Worldwide Church of God in the
significant Ninth Circuit case.
It is also important to note that because United States copyright doctrine is
federal law, the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act (RFRA) applies to
these proceedings. The Religious Freedom and Restoration Act was enacted
in 1993, and states that Government shall not substantially burden a person’s
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability, with the exception of the compelling interest/least restrictive
means test. This Act set a new course for religious freedom litigation. Prior
to RFRA, the Supreme Court of the United States in Employment Division v.
Smith held that the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the
obligation to comply with a “valid and neutral law of general applicability on
the ground that the law proscribes conduct that his religion prescribes.” 14
RFRA added the neutral and general applicability test and requires that the
government not substantially burden religious exercise, unless there is a
compelling government interest and is the least restrictive means of
furthering that compelling government interest. 15
RFRA currently applies only to federal law, and thus applies to copyright and
fair use doctrine. Without RFRA, the accuser would likely succeed easily
under the theory that the Copyright Act is a neutral and generally applicable
law not specifically targeting any one religion and therefore the infringing
religious organization’s free exercise is not being violated. As it stands now,
the accuser faces more of an uphill battle proving a compelling government
interest to protect their copyright.

14

Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (quoting
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263, n. 3 (1982) (ST EVENS, J., concurring in judgment)).
15
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (b)(1, 2) (1993).
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Importance of protecting religious copyright interests

Protecting the copyright of its scriptures is extremely important to religious
organizations. This is important to emphasize because it not only shows how
far religious organizations are willing to go to protect their intellectual
property, but it also shows that a court may be looking at these issues when
determining whether there is a commercial loss or harm on their potential
market. The Church of Scientology is the most extreme example of how far
churches are willing to go to protect their copyright.
The Church of Scientology views protecting their intellectual property as
protecting the rights of all internet users: “The Church has taken legal action
to protect Scientology intellectual properties from unauthorized copying and
distribution, resulting in landmark legal precedents that secure and preserve
the freedoms and legal rights of all who travel the information
superhighway.” 16 Whether or not the strong language here is true, it is evident
that the Church believes that protecting their copyright and intellectual
property is crucial to the potential success of their congregation. Reports
from news organizations have shown that the Church “scours the Net for
alleged copyright and trademark violations.” 17 The Church of Scientology
has also hired private investigators to look into “Rathburn’s [former member]
appropriation of the Church’s intellectual property, his threat to destroy its
copyrights, his exhortations to others to engage in theft of Church materials
and property and his public attacks upon Scientology and its officials.” 18 The
Church of Scientology may be an anomaly in terms of its “scouring,” yet it
is still evident how important protecting religious scripture can be for major
religious organizations.19
The Satanic Temple (TST) is another example of a religious organization that
takes legal measures to protect its copyright. In a recently filed complaint in
the Southern District of New York, TST alleged that “the Netflix television
series known as the Chilling Adventures of Sabrina benefited from and
What Has Been the Church’s Role in Protecting Free Speech and Intellectual Property Rights
on the Internet?, SCIENTOLOGY NEWSROOM, https://www.scientologynews.org/faq/what -hasbeen-the-church-role-in-protecting-internet-free-speech.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2019).
17
Scientologists in Trademark Disputes, CNET (Jan. 29, 1998),
https://www.cnet.com/news/scientologists-in-trademark-disputes/.
18
Scientology Takes Aim at “Going Clear” Documentary, NBC News (March 20, 2015, 8:59
AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/scientology-takes-aim-going-clear-documentaryn325256.
19
Scientology also has other litigation concerns over its “auditing” materials, which should not be
compared to its religious scriptures. T his is more of an economic concern than a religious freedom
issue, and the distinction is important.
16
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defamed TST’s unique original expression of the historic Baphomet, an
androgynous goat-headed deity.” 20 The Baphomet was an original sketch
made in the 1800’s, which TST argues it modified and transformed into a
statue to include children and several other original details, which constituted
TST as the copyright owner of those modifications. 21 For example, TST
argues that the children were strategically placed in the model to find a
“specific expression of bi-racial childlike innocence by children of different
races, looking up in reverence at the Baphomet.” 22 Additionally, TST claims
that that it made specific detail changes from the original sketch such as the
angle of the Baphomet’s arms, softening the eyes of the Baphomet so as to
imply wisdom, and the clothing design on the children. 23 Finally, TST
believes that their version of the Baphomet was not only an original
modification for which they own the copyright, but that extensive publicity
has made their specific statue and its changes a famous symbol of the TST.24
The Netflix series Chilling Adventures of Sabrina depicts the Baphomet, TST
argues, in conformity with an evil antagonist and misappropriates the TST
Baphomet to publish a false and defamatory depiction. 25 TST argues that
comments from the series’ producer show that they knew about the
modifications attributed to the creativity of TST, specifically that the TST
statue was the only depiction, which included children and a male chest
instead of the original sketch, which included female breasts. 26
TST is seeking $50 million in damages, no doubt looking to send a message
that their deity figure is not to be freely copied. 27 This is another example of
how religious organizations take their intellectual property seriously and why
this litigation is only in its early stages. The public controversy and potential
damaging reputation of being a litigious organization appears to be less
significant than protecting the reputation and pride of the church’s
intellectual property.

20

Complaint at 1, United Federation of Churches LLC d/b/a T he Satanic T emple v. Netflix, Inc.
and Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc., No. 1:18-cv-10372 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)
https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Netflix-Satanic-T emple.pdf.
21
Id. at 3.
22
Id. at 8.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Complaint at 3, United Federation of Churches LLC d/b/a T he Satanic T emple v. Netflix, Inc.
and Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc., No. 1:18-cv-10372 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)
https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Netflix-Satanic-T emple.pdf.
26
Id. at 13.
27
Id. at 6.
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Divine Authorship

A fascinating issue surrounding religious copyright disputes is the matter of
authorship. To hold a copyright in the United States, you must be the author
of an original work fixed in a tangible medium (or otherwise have a license
or authority to use the work). 28 Authorship is not often a difficult hurdle to
cross; the parties in a copyright suit generally stipulate to the matter of
authorship, unless there is some question of joint authorship or licensing
agreement. In the case of most religious disputes, however, the plaintiff
organization believes that their scripture was authored by God or a divine
figure. The obvious question then is who can have ownership to scripture
written by God? In the case of Scientology, the answer is easy. L. Ron
Hubbard authored all of the Church of Scientology’s scripture, and he (now
his estate) is the obvious copyright owner of the scripture. 29
In the matter of more widely followed faiths, the question isn’t quite as
simple. Without researching or looking into this issue, one might believe that
no organization or person has standing in court to sue on behalf of, for
example, the Christian Bible as its copyright owner. While this may be an
entertaining dinner table debate for lawyers, the U.S. Copyright Office has
answered the question in its Compendium of Practices. The third edition of
the compendium provides a “Human Authorship Requirement,” and
specifically excludes worked alleged to be created by a divine being. 30
To have standing in court, religious organizations must show that they made
some sort of original modification to the scripture. By admitting this to the
court, are they not simultaneously admitting to their congregation that the
scripture they teach is not authored by God and is instead the product of
human intervention? In some cases, groups may claim that God inspired the
authors of the scripture but that they used human characteristics to complete
the product. In this case, it should be clear that the copyright belongs to the
human author. Merely being inspired by the divine does not attribute the
credit to God. The copyright should be owned by the human that put the
inspiration to paper and created the work. The Church could also argue that
it merely translated the work from another language or added some original

28

17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1990).
History.com Editors, L. Ron Hubbard Publishes Dianetics, HISTORY (Aug. 21, 2018)
https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/l-ron-hubbard-publishes-dianetics.
30
Jarrod Welsh, Copyrighting God: New Copyright Guidelines Do Not Protect Divine Beings, 17
RUTGERS J. L. & RELIGION 121, 121–22 (2015).
29
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commentary so that their congregations could more easily understand the
teachings of the divine scripture, but it is nevertheless a tricky issue.
Another answer is that most religious scriptures were created prior to 1923
and are therefore in the public domain. 31 Literary works in the public domain
no longer have a copyright owner. They are owned by the public and anyone
can use them, save for a few exceptions like the “complete collections”
exception where one may have used creativity in putting together a collection
of works in the public domain for a commercial purpose. Translations and
commentary to works in the public domain constitute protectable copyright,
because the freedom to make new works based on public domain materials
ends where the resulting derivative work comes into conflict with a valid
copyright (in this case, the translation or commentary). 32
The question of authorship appears to be answered in religious copyright
cases, but still presents an interesting situation for religious organizations
who profess their scriptures to be the work of God or a divine figure.
II.

ARE CONSTITUTIONAL FREE EXERCISE INTERESTS
PROTECTED BY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COPYRIGHT
DOCTRINE?

When a group of members become dissatisfied with the direction of the
organization and break off into their own sect, the intellectual property of the
organization becomes necessary for the new group to freely exercise their
religious practices. Such disputes are becoming more frequent in religious
free exercise litigation. No case models this situation more closely than the
Ninth Circuit’s Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God.33

A.

Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God

Before founding the Worldwide Church of God, Herbert Armstrong grew up
in poverty, and began his career as a writer at a local Des Moines
newspaper.34 He later founded the Radio Church of God, renamed to
31

Rich Stim, Welcome to the Public Domain, Stanford Univ. Libraries (Oct. 2010)
https://fairuse.stanford.edu/overview/public-domain/welcome/.
32
Warner Bros. Entm't v. X One X Prods., 644 F.3d 584, 596 (8th Cir. 2011).
33
227 F.3d 1110.
34
Herbert W. Armstrong: An Unofficial Ambassador for World Peace, Phila. Church of God,
https://www.pcog.org/about/herbert -armstrong.
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Worldwide Church of God (WCG), in 1934. 35 He wrote the Church’s
scripture, Mystery of Ages (MOA), between 1984 and 1985. 36 He distributed
this religious scripture in The Plain Truth magazine free of charge to millions
to people.37 While religious organizations want to protect their intellectual
property, they also want to distribute their text on a wide scale. These two
interests come into conflict with one another in cases like Worldwide because
the group breaking off from the larger organization may not use the widely
distributed text to the organization’s liking. This results in
“misappropriation” and infringement lawsuits.
After Armstrong’s death his estate bequeathed his intellectual property rights
to the church and the church chose to discontinue distribution of the MOA
for views that they believed were outdated. 38 Examples of these outdated
views include ideas expressed regarding divorce, remarriage, and divine
healing.39 The Advisory Council of Elders believed that the MOA also
contained outdated views that were racist in nature and stopped distributing
the MOA because of “cultural standards of social sensitivity.” 40 Two former
members, Gerald Flurry and John Amos, later founded a new religious
organization, Philadelphia Church of God (PCG), which asserted that the
MOA was to be taken as true religious doctrine, and used the text as required
reading for all members. 41 WCG and PCG stipulated to the fact that PCG
copied the MOA verbatim, outside of a “suggested reading” section and a
warning against reproduction. 42 WCG sent a demand to PCG that it cease
infringing its copyright, and PCG ignored the demand. 43

WCG filed a copyright infringement suit against PCG, alleging that PCG was
“reproducing, distributing, promoting, advertising, and offering unlawful and
unauthorized copies of the MOA.” 44 At the district court level, the court
denied a summary judgment motion by WCG and granted PCG’s motion for
summary judgment.45 In just two paragraphs, the Ninth Circuit concluded
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

227 F.3d at 1113.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Worldwide Church of God, 27 F.3d at 1113.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1114.
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that WCG was the proper and valid owner of the copyright to the MOA. 46
PCG argued that Armstrong granted a nonexclusive, implied license for
MOA for those who value its religious message, but the court held that there
was not enough evidence to show Armstrong intended to create the MOA for
dissemination by third parties. 47
The issue of ownership in this case is interesting because WCG was
attempting to distance itself from what appears to be significant values
described in Armstrong’s scripture. If Armstrong were alive to see this
dispute, he might very well prefer, as the copyright owner, to grant a license
or permission to the group that was sticking to the core tenets of his teachings
rather than the organization that labeled his views as “outdated.” He may
have even disavowed the WCG and cited them for infringement if they
continued using their makeshift version of his scripture. As it stands,
however, the Ninth Circuit was correct in determining that WCG had proper
ownership of the MOA.
The far more controversial issue arising in this case is whether PCG’s use of
the MOA was fair as an exception to the exclusive rights of the copyright
owner. The Ninth Circuit adopted the reasoning of a Seventh Circuit case in
which the court held that the copyright owner may “prevent churches from
copying or publishing its copyrighted works, even if the churches only intend
to use the copies or publications at not-for-profit religious services.” 48 This
reasoning is sound, because churches may “profit” in the form of recruitment
and membership services the same way that a business may commercially
benefit from copyright infringement.
It would not be good policy to allow religious organizations to freely infringe
on the copyright of others merely because they are a non-profit organization.
The idea of the copyright owner being able to utilize their exclusive rights
should not be thrown by the wayside for churches. This principle is important
for reasons outside of monetary gain. The copyright holder may want to
strictly control the reputation of their work and not allow certain
organizations to be associated with the copyright holder. That should
absolutely be within the prerogative of the owner. There will be further
religious free exercise arguments that are more compelling, but the non-profit
nature of churches should not escape copyright doctrine.
46

Id.
Id.
48
F.E.L. Publications, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, No. 81-1333, 1982 WL 19198 (7th Cir.
Mar. 25, 1982).
47
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The court also briefly analyzed this issue from a First Amendment free
speech perspective. They cited a Second Circuit case, which noted that “the
public interest in the free flow of information is assured by the law’s refusal
to recognize a valid copyright in facts.” 49 This issue will be discussed further
in the section on judicial restraint, but it is important to note that the court is
essentially saying that the MOA is not a scripture of fact, but is rather the
product of original creativity that may validly be protected as copyright and
not as a collection of facts. If the court did believe that this was a book of
facts, the First Amendment issue may be worth a second look because facts
are generally not subject to copyright. As it stands, the Ninth Circuit believed
that the MOA was sufficiently creative to warrant copyright protection and
that right is not limited by First Amendment free speech concerns.
All four factors of fair use in this case were discussed and are worth
analyzing. Fair use in this case was a close question, but PCG’s failure to
provide any additional commentary or original modification to the MOA
prevents a fair use defense.
The first factor of fair use is the purpose and character of the use. 50 In other
words, was the use for commercial purposes or for educational means?
Generally, evidence of commercial gain turns against fair use when the
infringer is clearly profiting off the copyright of another. This factor is more
difficult in this case because the definition of “commercial gain” is not clear.
The Supreme Court of the United States broadly defined noncommercial use
in its Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios opinion: “A challenge
to a noncommercial use of a copyrighted work requires proof either that the
particular use is harmful, or that if it should become widespread, it would
adversely affect the potential market for the copyrighted work. Actual
present harm need not be shown.” 51 Harm to the potential market of WCG
will be discussed further with the fourth fair use factor, but it seems clear
from this Supreme Court holding that WCG must be able to show that PCG’s
use of their copyrighted work is harmful, not necessarily that they are losing
money.

49

227 F.3d at 1113 (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 560
(1985) (quoting Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. American Broad. Cos., Inc., 621 F.2d
57, 61 (2d Cir.1980)).
50
17 U.S. Code § 107 (1) (1992).
51
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984).
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A more recent Supreme Court opinion held that the first factor also turns on
“whether the new work merely supersedes the objects of the original creation
or instead adds something new…and to what extent the new work is
‘transformative’.” 52 The Ninth Circuit correctly noted that while a showing
of transformative use is not absolutely necessary under Campbell, in this case
there is no question that PCG copied the MOA verbatim and did not attempt
to make any such transformation or original modification.53 PCG may also
argue that they are putting the work in a new context, and therefore are adding
some original content to the work. The court would not likely side with PCG,
however, because the context in which PCG is using the MOA is the same as
it was used by WCG. The only difference now is that MOA no longer wishes
to exercise their right to perform or distribute the work.
PCG also argued that its use was not for a commercial purpose or for profit.
The court reasoned that the absence of a commercial use merely eliminates
the presumption of unfairness. 54 There is an argument, however, that PCG
does financially gain from their copying. During the time of their use of the
MOA, PCG’s membership grew to seven thousand members, who tithe ten
percent of their income.55 The court therefore ruled that the first factor
weighed against fair use in this case.
The second factor of fair use is the nature of the copyrighted work. 56 This is
probably the weakest factor for PCG, as the work is undoubtedly creative and
not informational. The court reasoned that “while it may be viewed as
‘factual’ by readers who share Armstrong’s religious beliefs, the creativity,
imagination, and originality embodied in MOA tilt the scale against fair
use.”57 The only possible argument for PCG here is that the court should
show restraint in determining whether the MOA is a work of fact or
creativity. This is not an argument that appears to have been made or
discussed by the court, but the opinion does seem to suggest that the MOA is
not a work of fact. At the very least, it determined that there is enough
creativity in the MOA to turn against fair use and against its use as a factual,
informational guide.

52
53
54
55
56
57

Campbell v. Acuff–Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579(1994).
227 F.3d at 1117.
Id.
Id.
17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (1992).
Id.
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The third factor of fair use is the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole. 58 In this case, PCG
copied the entirety of the MOA save for a page or two. The court stressed
that copying an entire work “militates against a finding of fair use.” 59 In
almost all non-religious cases, the analysis would stop there. PCG argued,
however, that its copying was reasonable because the MOA is religious in
nature.60 The court did not find merit to this argument and cited a previous
Ninth Circuit case which reasoned that copying and using a work for the same
purpose as the owner is a strong indication against fair use. 61 Here, PCG’s
purpose of using the MOA is the same purpose as WCG; to recruit members
and raise charitable funds for the use of the religious organization. The court
held that a “reasonable person would expect PCG to pay WCG for the right
to copy and distribute MOA created by WCG with its resources.” 62
The fourth factor is the effect of the use upon the potential market for the
value of the copyrighted work. 63 In accordance with the policy of allowing
criticism, effect on the market must come from exhaustion of the demand,
not from criticism of the work. 64 PCG and WCG are not seeking a typical
commercial market, but rather a market of membership and donations.
Additionally, because WCG no longer agrees with the teachings of the MOA,
aren’t PCG and WCG merely competing in the market of ideas, not the same
religious market? The court correctly reasons that “[r]eligious, educational
and other public institutions would suffer if their publications invested with
an institution’s reputation and goodwill could be freely appropriated by
anyone.”65 If the purpose behind protecting copyright is to allow the owner
to control the associations and reputation of their work, outside of preventing
commentary and criticism, then it makes sense that a rival organization
should not be able to freely appropriate that work with the goal of recruiting
the same potential members. The court also noted that WCG planned on
creating an annotated version of the MOA, which harms the potential of such
a venture if PCG was to freely distribute the original copy. 66
A compelling counterargument to this note is that an annotated copy would
itself be an original modification and an entirely separate copyrighted work.

58

17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (1992).
227 F.3d at 1117 (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 560,
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PCG’s use of the original MOA would not dissuade a potential customer
from instead purchasing the WCG’s annotated version. That customer may
very well agree with WCG that the original views of Herbert Armstrong are
outdated and would prefer an annotated copy of the MOA to reflect more
socially progressive ideas. Additionally, PCG is the one making the pitch and
persuading new members to join their organization, not necessarily the MOA
alone. If WCG weren’t planning its own annotated copy, then PCG could
make a persuasive argument that there is no longer an exhaustion of demand,
but they are now instead competing in the marketplace of ideas since WCG
no longer believes in the teachings of the MOA. If the MOA scripture alone
is not persuading the potential market, then the market demand has not been
exhausted as a result of PCG’s use.
PCG could also make the argument that because WCG no longer has an
interest in distributing the original MOA, it is holding the original Armstrong
teachings hostage under the shield of copyright law. Therefore, under RFRA,
they are substantially burdened from practicing their faith without being able
to orally reproduce or read the scriptures in the MOA. I will discuss the
RFRA argument in more detail below.
The Ninth Circuit Court ultimately did not buy the argument from PCG that
the MOA no longer had market value to WCG. 67 The court reasoned that the
author’s decision not to use his copyright does not mean that they are no
longer entitled to protection of the copyright. 68 Additionally, WCG planned
on distributing an annotated version of the MOA, so the argument that WCG
had completely abandoned their rights was not fruitful.
I agree with the court’s decision that fair use does not favor PCG. While I
recognize the harm to PCG in that they cannot continue to use the religious
text on which their faith is based, there was nothing to stop PCG from
creating their own modification or annotated copy of the MOA for its own
recruitment and membership purposes. They could have created a new copy
of the MOA in which they discussed why they believed modifying the MOA
to conform with societal trends was wrong and why they believed WCG was
moving in the wrong direction. Such a modification to the MOA would likely
have been fair use because it would have been a commentary on the original
copy while PCG could also maintain to its members that the original
foundation of the scriptures was the proper reading of their faith.
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The only protectable practice in this case was PCG’s public performance
(sermons) and educational Sunday school teachings from the MOA. In the
case of religious performance, however, it is difficult to perform a sermon or
religious teaching without the scripture, and PCG was likely reading from
the protected scripture as part of its performance. The members of the church
are also likely following along with the text. The first factor, purpose and
character of the use, favors PCG in the case where they are reading the MOA
or teaching the MOA for educational purposes. Additionally, Section 110 on
the limitations on exclusive rights has a section which excludes the
performance of a “nondramatic literary or musical work or of a dramaticomusical work of a religious nature, or display of a work, in the course of
services at a place of worship or other religious assembly.” 69 If PCG was
merely preaching about the teachings of the MOA or teaching a Sunday
School class about Herbert Armstrong’s core religious doctrines, then
Section 110 would likely have allowed for this use. Distributing the scripture
for gain in the market of recruitment, however, is not an educational purpose
or performance and almost certainly harms the potential market of WCG.
Therefore, I believe the court’s fair use finding was missing some analysis
but was ultimately decided correctly.
The final consideration in this case was PCG’s contention that preventing
their congregation from using the MOA would amount to a violation of
RFRA.70 As discussed earlier, RFRA provides that “Government shall not
substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results
from a rule of general applicability.” 71 PCG argued that an injunction
preventing them from using the MOA would substantially burden a “central
tenet of its religious doctrine, namely, distribution of MOA to current and
potential adherents of its church.” 72 The court acknowledged that whether
RFRA can be extended to the copyright doctrine is an unresolved and open
issue, but ultimately dodged the issue. 73 The Ninth Circuit came to that
conclusion because PCG failed to take any steps in seeking a license or
negotiating with WCG to come to an agreement that would allow them to coexist.74 Therefore, the court did not believe that PCG had shown that it was
being subjected to a substantial burden. 75
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While the Ninth Circuit did opine in one sentence as to whether RFRA should
override copyright doctrine, it did not rule on this “knotty” question. 76 The
court merely speculated that it is unlikely that Congress meant for RFRA
legislation to include “the protection of intellectual property rights against
unauthorized appropriation.” 77 Unfortunately, this is the only bit of analysis
we got on the issue, but it appears the Ninth Circuit is unlikely to override
copyright law with RFRA arguments.
If the court was sufficiently convinced that a restriction on the use of
copyrighted religious doctrine was a substantial burden to the defendant, it
would have had to analyze whether copyright law and fair use passes the
strict scrutiny test contained within RFRA. 78 Once it has been established
that there is a substantial burden, the first test of RFRA’s strict scrutiny
requirement is whether the government has a compelling interest in
substantially burdening a person’s exercise of religion. 79 In this case, WCG,
or the plaintiff owner in any copyright case involving a RFRA issue, would
likely argue that protecting the translations, annotations, commentaries, and
creative works included in scripture is a compelling interest that the court
should uphold.
As a matter of policy, the United States values innovation and the financial
incentive to innovate. Christopher Yoo from Vanderbilt University law
school succinctly describes the economic purpose for copyright law,
“Nonrivalry is generally modeled by assuming that the marginal cost of
making an additional copy of a copyrightable work is zero. These
assumptions imply that markets provide insufficient incentives to produce
copyrightable works and provide insufficient access to those works that are
produced.”80 Professor Yoo goes on in this article to critique this
conventional way of thinking about the policy behind copyright, but his
description of the conventional thinking is the way that WCG would likely
frame the issue. Without copyright protection, the market may allow a
copycat writer with better marketing and more fame to copy a work verbatim
and profit off the back of another writer.
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We allow this free market structure for most industries because it incentivizes
companies to put out better products, but it does not apply the same to
copyright. The market cannot protect the years of work it takes an author to
write a novel or the time spent by a musician writing the lyrics to a hit song.
In this case, there is an additional wrinkle that the copyright owner no longer
uses or believes in the work. This is tricky for the “exhaustion of demand”
analysis because PCG could argue that the demand for a religious
organization which follows the teachings of the MOA is a different market
from that which WCG now seeks. The general understanding of the policy
behind copyright is that we protect artists so that they are incentivized to
create. To allow copyright infringement may not be as extreme a
consequence as allowing, for example, human sacrifice in the name of
religion, but both consequences would allow religious organizations to
escape justice.
On the other side, PCG and other parties in favor of overruling copyright law
with RFRA would likely argue that protecting free exercise of faith is a more
significant government interest than protecting the individual, personal gain
interest. If these interests cannot align, then the infringing party would argue
that the court should uphold free exercise interests over copyright law.
The second prong of RFRA is that the furtherance of the compelling
government interest must be the least restrictive means of furthering that
interest.81 Putting aside the two parties for a moment, I believe that the least
restrictive means of furthering both copyright law and religious free exercise
is solved by enforcing the fair use doctrine. In the Worldwide case, PCG’s
use would have been fair if it had just added its own commentary or
annotations to the MOA. 82 Fair use allows religious scripture to be copied as
long as there is some original addition or difference in the new work. Asking
the infringing or copying party to include or add commentary or some
additional creative contribution to religious scripture is not a substantial
burden on a person’s ability to practice their faith. PCG would likely counter
by saying the text of the MOA is their core religious doctrine, and any
modification would be against the intent of Herbert Armstrong. They may
also argue that their use of the work is verbal, and their verbal teachings
provide additional commentary that makes the use fair. A court may have to
entangle itself in religious questions with this argument, because they would
have to decide whether the verbal use was a “substantial” section of the
original text.
81
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PCG also argues that their audience is a different market than that of WCG,
as they are trying to distance themselves from the “outdated” views written
by Armstrong. Therefore, PCG would likely pass the fourth test of fair use
without issue.
Professor Thomas Berg suggests in his piece on this issue that a possible
solution would be for a court to award damages but deny an injunction. 83 This
may be a less restrictive means of enforcing the interest of copyright law, but
still comes with the problem of religious organizations believing that
infringement amounts to misappropriation. Ultimately, the copyright holder
should be the one to determine to whom they license the work. Refusing to
issue an injunction may still result in harm to the potential market. This is
especially relevant to religious organizations because recruitment and
membership is generally more important to a congregation (as long as they
can keep the doors open) than financial gain. WCG, for example, was making
changes to their religious scripture because they wanted to manage the
reputation of the church. If that scripture is still attached to WCG as the
copyright owner and is being used elsewhere in a way they disapprove of,
then damages cannot solve the issue. PCG may not advertise the fact that the
MOA was originally owned and used by WCG, but it’s possible people may
still associate the two together. This is more typical of a trademark dispute,
but reputation of the copyright owner is still an important factor for the owner
to consider in copyright use. Professor Berg’s solution may be better than
nothing, but still does not satisfy significant concerns of the religious
organization copyright holder.
Whether RFRA invalidates the copyright doctrine in the case of religious
disputes will likely continue to be a heavily-litigated issue. Until the Supreme
Court has an opportunity to rule on this issue, circuit courts will also likely
continue to dodge a precedential holding.
B.

Judicial Restraint in Religious Copyright Litigation

The basic idea of judicial restraint is that judges should only comment or rule
on issues where they have and are the proper authority. For example, this
generally means that judges should not be activists in their decisions unless
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the law is clearly unconstitutional. 84 Because most judges are appointed and
not elected, citizens do not have an opportunity to vote out a judge because
of a bad ruling. Citizens do, however, have the opportunity to remove
members of Congress if they do not like the legislation the Congress member
supports. The primary principle of judicial restraint is that even if a judge
disagrees with the content of the suit or the consequences of a statute, they
will not rule based on their personal views but rather on whether the
Constitution has been violated or not. 85 This principle is not practiced by all
judges but is an important federalist value.
Judicial restraint in free exercise litigation is crucial to uphold the ideals of
federalism. Judges are not and should not be the source that Americans turn
to when determining whether faith is based in fact or whether a particular
religious practice is appropriate. On the other hand, we don’t want judges to
allow injustices under the guise of a religious practice. This issue was raised
all the way back in 1878 in the famous Reynolds v. U.S. by Chief Justice
Waite:
Suppose one believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part of
religious worship, would it be seriously contended that the civil
government under which he lived could not interfere to prevent a
sacrifice? …To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines
of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to
permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. 86

This is, again, a more extreme version of the principle that we do not want to
allow civil or criminal wrongdoings in the name of free religious exercise. In
the case of religious copyright, while judges shouldn’t comment or rule on
the truthfulness or factual/fictional nature of faith, they need to be able to
determine whether use of religious scripture is fair. This tension isn’t always
a difficult issue to overcome. Professor Thomas Berg commented on this
issue, “A court could easily decide that the intention of a religious work was
to convey spiritual information without determining whether the information
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is true.” 87 He cited a case involving the Church of Scientology where the
Second Circuit concluded that Ron Hubbard’s works were informational, and
therefore a biography quoting those works was more subject to a fair use
defense.88 In these cases, judges need not practice judicial restraint if the
court is not required to make judgments on the truthfulness or inherent
goodness in a particular faith.
It is important for judges to practice judicial restraint in cases where they
must make a judgment on the truthfulness or factual nature of religious
scripture when it is not clearly informational. Courts should generally avoid
entanglements with religious pronouncements, but fair use litigation may
require a court to listen to expert witnesses as to which part of the scripture
is most significant and substantial. Luckily for most judges, it is usually clear
if a scripture appears to try and persuade or rather merely conveys
information.
C.

CONCLUSION

The doctrine of fair use should be the solution to the conflict between RFRA
or religious free exercise issues and copyright law. As highlighted by the
Worldwide case in the Ninth Circuit, the infringing party has the opportunity
to add original modifications to religious scripture including commentary,
annotations, translations, or creative new additions. If the infringing party
copies a religious text verbatim and there is no attempt to modify the
protected work, then courts should hold that the infringing party is strictly
liable as the Ninth Circuit did.
In the same way that we do not want to allow human sacrifice under the shield
of religion, we should not allow verbatim copying without some sort of
original modification to religious scripture. Religious organizations are not
substantially burdened by having to comment on or annotate their religious
scripture and even if they were, fair use would pass the strict scrutiny test set
out in RFRA.
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